

«ЧЕЛОВЕК – СЛОВО – ПАРАДИГМА» В ОСНОВЕ БИОГРАФИЧЕСКИ ОРИЕНТИРОВАННОГО НАУЧНОГО ПИСЬМА

Аннотация. Исследователей, занимающихся автоэтнографией, интересуют вопросы, связанные со значимыми моментами, ориентированными на личный опыт. Данная статья касается вопросов терминологии и семантики этнографии, а также эпистемологического статуса автоэтнографии в социальных исследованиях. Представляет интерес и понятие изменения, с особым акцентом на терминах, используемых в научных дисциплинах, и распределением акцентов, относящимся к области, в которой еще не раскрыты личные истории, – научным биографиям и связанными с ними биографическими сочинениями. Привлечение внимания к личным сообщениям, часто по темам, выходящим за рамки научного континуума, делает академическое сообщество «межбиографическим сообществом» — сообществом, которое совместно делится нарративами. Сколько нарративов находится в пространстве соразделения и в какой мере личный опыт и стоящие за ними истории эмоций составляют методологический инструмент, можно наблюдать, следя за направлением саморефлексивного подхода в рамках научного письма и интеллектуальных биографий. Смена парадигм как самостоятельная и ведущая интерпретация научного исследования предположительно направлена на преодоление сложившегося канона (застывших теоретических и практических моделей), компоненты которого теряют значимость, устаревают из-за несоответствия духу времени и в итоге получают статус анахронизма.

Ключевые слова: автоэтнография, исследовательские парадигмы, биографические исследования, научная биография, источниковедение.

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HUMAN – WORD – PARADIGM. AT THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOGRAPHICALLY ORIENTED SCIENTIFIC WRITING

Abstract. Researchers taking up autoethnography are also interested in issues related to meaningful moments that are focused on personal experiences. This text refers to selected issues in terms of terminology and semantics, as well as the epistemological status of autoethnography in (social) research. The concept of change is also of interest, with particular emphasis on the terms used in scientific disciplines and the distribution of accents related to the area in which personal histories have not yet been exposed – scientific biographies and biographical writing related to it. Coming into prominence of personal messages, often on subjects going beyond the scientific continuum, makes the academic community an “interbiographic community” – community which is co-sharing narratives. How many narrations there are in the space for (co)sharing and to what extent personal experience and histories of emotions behind them constitute a methodological tool - one can observe by following the direction of self-reflexive turn within scientific writing and intellectual biographies. The paradigm shift, as a “self-empowered” and leading interpretation of scientific research, can be said to be aimed at overcoming the current canon (fixed theoretical and practical models) whose components lose significance, become outdated, insufficient for the spirit of time, ending in anachronism status.

Keywords: autoethnography, research paradigms, biographical research, scientific biography, source studies.

1. In the face of change: turn and paradigm shift

The autoreflexive turn, mentioned in the title, is a form of change that reorganizes the interest of many disciplines, with particular reference to the sciences of culture from which it originates. It is therefore a cultural expression, although it explores disciplinedly peripheral subject spheres. As Andreas Reckwitz notes: “*The culturally-oriented phrase emphasizes in the social sciences what in the terminology of Gaston Bachelard might be called an "epistemological break": the introduction and dissemination of a new cognitive leading vocabulary that opens up a new kind of analytical perspective*” [5, p. 22].

The vocabulary, as the main but not the only tool within the turn, is a kind of concepts` grid whose status can be traced to the nature of travelling concepts described by Mieke Bal [6] – their significance becomes interdisciplinary negotiative – but they are moving between disciplines, contributing both their construction and deconstruction. However they are easily criticized for their innovativeness or originality, as they often become only derivatives that are fixed and stabilized in the disciplines of the definition.

The above, rather cursory characteristics, also refer to other turns in the scientific discourse: the superior to all cultural expressions – the linguistic turn and others which Doris Bachmann-Medick [5] describes in detail: interpretative turn, performative turn, reflexive turn, postcolonial turn, spatial turn, iconic turn, and increasingly present mnemonic turn related to the phenomenon of memory boom, that is, increased in the

global dimension interest in representations of memory in both scientific and public discourse. One could also point to the dispositive turn (dispositive Wende) related to the analysis of the *le dispositif* in the sense that Michel Foucault gave it.

What exactly the turn is, when it is done and what is its operating power? It is worth responding to these questions by not only addressing issues of epistemological nature, but also all efforts to prepare and conduct research.

In the first place reference should be made to the interpretive role (di/convergence) of paradigms and turns – also called paradigmatic transitions or shifts. The paradigm shift will mean a change in what provides the rules that allow us to capture the sketched nature of the problem and the possible outline of the solution [5, p.18] – as a change – that include the laws, theories, applications and technical equipment – the models of actual scientific practice accepted by the academics. The paradigm shift, as a self-empowered and leading interpretation of scientific research, can be said to be aimed at overcoming the current canon (fixed theoretical and practical models) whose components lose significance, become outdated, insufficient for the spirit of time, ending in anachronism status. This process can be compared to one of the forms of forgetfulness described by Paul Connerton, namely falling into type of forgetting, which is constitutive in the formation of a new identity [11, s.62-63], in this case the identity of scientific discipline. The essence of change does not involve a violent loss or fall of the existing worldview, but with the ability to deliberately reject patterns that have ceased to serve theoretical, cognitive or practical purposes. Connerton explains it as follows: “<...> certain things must be forgotten because they must be discarded. This long-term forgetting as a process of cultural discarding in the interests of forming a new identity is signalled by two types of semantic evidence, one the emergence of a new type of vocabulary, the other the disappearance of a now obsolete vocabulary. On the one hand, certain substantives, which refer at once to historical movements in the present and to projects for the future, enter the currency: History, Revolution, Liberalism, Socialism, Modernity itself. On the other hand, certain words previously employed by writers in English cease to be used and are no longer easily recognizable: memorous (memorable), memorious (having a good memory), memorist (one who prompts the return of memories), mnemonize (to memorize), mnemonicon (a device to aid the memory) Could there be a more explicit indication than that signalled in these two semantic shifts of what is thought desirable and what is thought dispensable?” [11, p. 64].

The paradigm of its nature cannot afford to ignore the change that has been inscribed in it – characterized by Thomas Kuhn as a scientific revolution [16, p. 197], which is proof of the vitality of thought, perhaps also our existence, proof that life goes on. The change, transition, shift, or paradigm crisis – all these terms constitute the method of <architectonization> of science – the concept “architectonization method” I borrow from work “Theory of Vision” of Wladyslaw Strzeminski [19, p. 92]. Circumstances relevant to paradigmatic changes/shifts are also clearly visible in areas not directly related to science – in painting they will include Strzeminski’s analysis of the transition from the “contour view”, through “silhouette view”, “seeing the solid”, “chiaroscuro vision” to “full empirical sight”. Characteristic and referring to the methods of architecture are “after-image phenomena” – as Strzeminski explains: “After-image vision and the architectural method connected with it are not a combination of real and unreal, but simply an extension of the existing visual base”. This extension can be found by analogy in the changes taking place in scientific disciplines.

In the case of paradigms the method of “architectonization” of science leading to cognitive delimitation: the paradoxical nature of antiquity causes that, on the one hand, it guarantees a ready interpretative template – recalling Foucault’s “box with tools”; on the other hand, to the extent of the Roman god Janus, has control over all origins and ends, it does not allow to go beyond the expectations horizon [15, p. 357–386]. It provides the framework in which the researchers representing individual analytical practices are written or as Mieke Bal would say “implemented”. She introduces the concepts of frame and framing, creating a supporting alternative for the concept of context as a non-conceptual data set, which is out of focus and insufficient for interpretive analytical practices. Recalling one of the meanings of the framing, it refers to the term “frame-up” (to set up) – in this reflection related to the supervision and exerting influence, and thus power exercised through knowledge [6, pp. 161–201].

Naturally, the process of “framing” within the paradigm, although it is a form of control and favors “being made”, is indispensable for producing a critical mass without that the scientific revolution will not go on. In the context of turns (especially cultural ones), the shift assigns the focus to the abolition of cognition (it could be said that the phrase does not have anything paradigmatic in itself), as illustrated by Victoria E. Bonnel and Lynn Hunt: “*Since World War II, new intellectual fashions in the social sciences have emerged in rapid succession. For all their variations, until recently they generally fell into two broad categories: research paradigms that proposed to organize the study of society on the model of the natural sci-*

ences and those approaches that belonged to the interpretative and hermeneutic tradition, with its emphasis on human subjectivity contextual meaning” [7, p. 1].

In the above, research paradigms refer to Kuhn’s understanding of the paradigm, based on the foundation of the natural sciences, and the approaches are closer to the notion of turn, as the result of their emergence is not to divert existing interpretations and replace them with new ones but new opening in the semantic field and analytical practice, a new angle of view, or a change of approach. At this point one can ask the question of the legitimacy of the paradigm (as a central category of cognition) in social sciences – if there is no agreement on which of the paradigms can be considered as valid or at least adequate, or the question (no less controversial) is if research process should be based on any paradigm as a standard model?

Making an attempt to characterize the turn, bearing in mind in particular the accents that will be relevant to the phenomenon of self-reflection as present in the scientific texts, the following of its features should be mentioned:

1. The turn is not coded – it takes place at a certain time, but the rate of change is not so violent, and the change itself is not irreversible – as it happens during the scientific revolution (replacing the existing paradigm and replacing it with a new one). It’s clearly emphasized in Doris Bachmann-Medick’s works, stated that “It is never about the full and wide backward of the whole discipline, but rather about the creation and profiling of individual turns and new focuses, due to which a given fact or research assumption might be susceptible to interdisciplinary connections. Things come to multiplicity of methods, to crossing borders, to taking over methods or understanding them in an eclectic way – but not to create a new paradigm that would fully replace the other, previous one” [5, p. 19]. According to Thomas Kuhn’s reasoning, a new paradigm emerges on the way of “sudden acts of inspiration” [16, p. 160], the changes are not of an evolutionary nature.

2. The turn does not lead to an interpretative monopoly – it does not provide ready-made schemes, rather invites you to discover new paths than points them out.

3. The turn comes to the time and space, the turn can be observed in a contemporary way and in the “theater of everyday life”, while the paradigm shift is sanctioned (announced) post factum – when all the transformations have already taken place.

4. The turn changes the direction of interest in a particular area by focusing attention on new points or by shifting the current angle of view in relation the same objects.

5. The turn forms innovative capital – both with regard to the object of interest (sensitizing and exposing what has been hidden or barely discernible or unauthorized) and with tools – by bringing a new (reformative) and powerful vocabulary.

6. Foundation of the turn should first be seen in the process of translation and reception of individual terms (usually as components of specific theories) – they are infiltrated into a global scientific discourse and, as the “wandering concepts”, launch interdisciplinary vocabularies (possible in the methodology of scientific disciplines).

7. The key touchstone for the appearance of a turn is the transformation of the object of analysis (research object) into the category of analysis – when the interest confined to the new cognitive objects becomes transformed into the instrument and the medium of cognition. In the case of scientific biographies (and autobiographical threads appearing in scientific works), the turn will not mean only deep reflection on the researcher’s experiences as a cognizing subject, but first of all the use of (inter)disciplinary recognition instruments (which may include, for example, trajectories, border situations, transgression, the category of educational strategies, developmental tasks, educational lines in biography, reminiscence therapy, etc.) in building one’s own story. This means that the current personal history, the subject of the analysis (the subject of the study or our particular interest), transforms into an analytical category (related to analytical work) expanding the scope of our research awareness – it allows us to observe and express phenomena found on the secondary areas of discipline – the story of it becomes in a way a catalyst for change.

Moreover, this phenomenon is accompanied by reorientation of concepts – descriptive concepts (notions) become operational ones.

The above concretizations are reflected in the arguments presented by Bachmann–Medick: “*Directing of the turns is expressed into the attitude in the process of perception, in operational approaches and concepts as well as analytical categories. These different ways of focusing and transferring the centers of gravity, but also more specialized methods provide the opportunity to check specific research assumptions not only because of the cultural and scientific level of their reflection, but also of their location in a specific theoretical discourse” [5, p. 8].*

Turns, and in particular the self-reflective return, show that scientific texts do not belong only to one type of discourse, while their creation is sometimes familiar to unconventional ways of exploring reality.

Personal experiences turn out to be a particularly valuable tool in the critical examination of various topics – from contact with art or literature, to contemplation of dark matter in physics. They often deconstruct scientific writing in its classical, objective formula, introducing metaphorical or even poetic elements – as a result one can get the impression that the boundary between creativity and practicing science has been blurred – or should it be said that the border still exists, but the essence of the turn is continuous (permanent) trespassing it, to be able to come back with new experiences.

2. Biographical imperative: personal experience in a scientific biography

As it comes to Agnes Heller's point of view, one of the most important premises for the fall of the great narratives and the birth of postmodern historical consciousness was what we would (probably) today call the "space" of the Holocaust experience [10, p. 142]. Individual stories began to be heard, showing a human and his uniqueness in the context of various life situations, often difficult and crisis-related. Looking at life from the perspective of her/his own biography doesn't play a role only in the individual dimension anymore, slowly paving the way for public discourse. It is also scientific discourse in recent years. The nature of individual experiences makes them leave a trace in human memory, and once told, they become part of the socio-cultural reality – becoming somehow incorporated into a certain community of experiences: a community of "collective subjectivity" of researchers referring here to *life story* in contrast to *life history*. The "collective subjectivity" define a community of experiences appropriate to a given social class or professional group, or a group of people who grew up in similar socio-historical conditions. Collective subjectivity refers here to the facts present in narratives, and therefore to life history – which together with the life story constitutes, among others, main part of the *oral histories*. The story guarantees, therefore, a "long duration", at the same time opening the reflection perspective in a wider scope, showing how important place occupy not stories cumulated in our memory, but those released from it.

The lens of biographicity – the concept suggested by Peter Alheit, trying to explain the meaning construct, which contains the concept of subjective, independent choice of learning patterns, and at the same time goes beyond them, enabling the creation of new structures of experience [2, p.8] – on the basis of scientific discourse has been turned towards experimental and analytical practice, that adopted as its basis auto-observation, autonarration, autoreflexion and autoformation. The aforementioned practice, known as autoethnography, has been essentially characterized on the Polish research ground as: "<...>*multidimensional research practice which, basing itself on and starting from the act of self-narrative that follows a lively, personal experience, may involve various actions of the cognizing subject, producing on different levels specific research systems within which knowledge is generated*" [14, pp. 52–53].

Reflection (Reflexion, Reflexivität) – that is, the ability to refer to yourself in each of the time perspectives: the past, present and future (not only in the context of the past) is necessary to generate this knowledge (bearing in mind that personal experience, although it is always true and credible for a cognizing subject also has its limitations). It is worth noting here that the in-depth meaning of the referred term – reflection (reflection, along with reflexivity and retrospectivity, belongs to the category of self-reversing abilities, in which the subject simultaneously occupies the position of the observer and the observed. Another interpretations of the above terms can be found in the literature, one of the most interesting is the category of socio-biographical reflection and its various modes, which is distinguished from reflection as itself or retrospective may be on the one hand considered as based on Latin origin – as "re-disposing" (*reflecto, reflexi, reflexum*), which takes into account the grammatical form of autoreflexivity. One can also refer to it – having based on the language – understood as a system of signs and education through language – then the retrospective accentuates such elements as the "considerating" and "prudence of memories" invoked by Johann Herder [15, p. 453]. In the text or narrative, ability to make a self-reference is expressed in the use of the first person pronouns or self-referring phrases that refer to the narrator and in which the narrator deliberately refers to himself [18, p. 270]. Thus, reflection understood as an analysis of one's own experience combined with a theoretical reconstruction is necessary to transform any of our experiences into knowledge [21, p. 188]. Due to such introspection that autoformation or self-formation is possible. Koselleck recalls the concept of self-formation to distinguish it from self-education, burdened with exaggerated and unnecessary auto-didacticism [15, p. 420].

The experimental nature of autoethnography gives a new direction to scientific writing – it allows us to intertwine personal experiences, memories coming both from our own memory and postmemory and quasi-memory [13], fictions and inventions, fragments of literary works, metaphors or even anecdotes. Some features of assemblage techniques that work with an unconventional approach to the subject, sometimes even controversial are given to autoethnography, which is a specific challenge (and not only in relation to the writ-

ing technique). In the arts we can find *assemblage* among others in the works of Wladyslaw Hasior (e.g. “Black Landscape I – Children of the Zamosc area”) or Tadeusz Kantor (e.g. “Umbrella and a Woman”). One could say that researchers as participants of the academic community go into biographisation – using their interpretative potential, analytical predisposition and biographical competence (understood as the ability to learn from one's own biography and other people, and the ability to consciously and multilaterally react to the environment, which can be associated with emotional and social intelligence or the category of – mindfulness) tend to consciously “embed / inscript” personal experience into research practice and, as a result, place it on the map of professional biography – in this case the scientific one. This is not the first “biographical turn” in social sciences, but it is distinguished by a special “biographical imperative” – the concept which refers to subjective and narrative turn, emphasizing personal and social understanding and the active role of people as moral perpetrators and participants of social processes, including learning processes – personal experience opens to reality – ceases to be a subject of exploration, becoming its tool in analytical work. In other words, experience that as it is transformed and put into (con)text is no longer subject to analysis, the process of analysis takes place through experience – in this way it loses the function of a descriptive concept in favor of an operational concept that reconstructs reality. This is another example of a possible “wandering concept”.

The receptive aspects of experience will mean (especially in terms of hermeneutics) that every human being has his own paths in the world, his own perspectives, horizons or, as Jacques Derrida would say, contexts. Human life immersed in historical, cultural and social circumstances is saturated with symbols, symbolically structured experience is characterized by a reflexive nature and after all, the “symbol gives us food for thought” [17, p.7]. Reflection, reflexivity or retrospective make the biography an idiographic dimension. Human existence is captured as a whole and in the context of the subjectively experienced biographical histories. This historicity is an important element in the hermeneutic theory of experience. It shows that although we live in the present, our actions and cognition are determined by the past as well as directed towards the future. In other words, the content of our life is shaped by past events, also that we haven't experienced personally, and which were intermediated by other people, situations or events which have been accumulated in the present and direct us to the future.

If we consider textualizing human's experience, the question arises how to define a “text” that is extremely widely understood in hermeneutics. Generally assuming – it is a manifestation of human life or its various aspects, taking the form of speech, writing or movement. Therefore a human living is also telling his/her life through speech or writing and in this process less or greater emotional involvement is of key importance. We find such a formula in evocative autoethnography (unlike in its analytic version), where the postulated emotional consonance is realized through a subjective description of personal experiences. The issue of focusing the experience around memory is also worth considering – being the factor structuring the experience in the biography (e.g. memory acquired / inacqured memory). As it is possible to use substitutive memory as a source, an object or an instrument of cognition or as a carrier of meanings/forming mechanism – in this context it seems not without significance to `lend` similar traits to experience. It can be assumed as in Paul Ricoeur's work that human action as well as written text can be read as text. The attempt to understand and interpret it is similarly, in the circle of autoethnographic research, the researcher – observer – appears as an active creator of meanings. He considers, among others motives of behavior, circumstances of events or criteria for making choices about the way of life or one of its paths. Thus, understanding and interpretation are coherent: they co-exist as a way of *being – in – the world* or as a way to discover and learn about it. However, attention should be paid to the fact that the space of experience will always be an already interpreted space (and burdened with meanings) – as in the case of double hermeneutics and reconstructive method, in which the researcher undertakes the reconstruction of what is already functioning as a reconstruction. Thus, this method always aims at second-degree reconstruction assuming that the researcher's task is second-degree observation. Interpretation as such is not only a cognitive task, explaining what the text means in its own terms, but also what it means in dialogue with the researcher and for the. In a metaphorical sense, as Strzeminski [19, p.53] would say: “in the process of seeing, it is not important what the eye captures mechanically, but what a man *relizes* from his vision”. In the process of seeing understood in this way, we are dealing not only with looking (as an conjunctive activity – based on the memory, habitual fixation of the object or image and its reproduction thanks to the previous entering in the *corpus memoriae*), but also with the interpretation (communicative activity – incarnating the object/image in the verbal communication area). Way of seeing makes it possible to visualize the text [6 p. 63], and thus to create an image based on stimuli from it, which allows to bring to light the presence and key meaning of images in reading – implementing the postulate of evocative autoethnography: activating emotional resonance in the reader and adapting accumulated subjectivity.

3. *Drifting goal – shared narratives/shareable narratives*

Regardless of fact that evocative ethnography is assigned to idiographic approach and the analytical one to the nomothetic approach (while evocative autoethnography is disciplined by emotions, analytical autoethnography is disciplined by empirical data), the act of autonarration, characteristic for both kind of practices may be transformed in the process of conversational intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is referred to narrative (autonarration), which can take two different statuses. Thus, one can point to a narrative (co)shared with others (shared narrative) and a narrative possible to share (shareable narrative). The first one refers to the past, taking the act of narrative as an accomplished one, the other is directed towards the future and concerns the potential narrative, the one that we could (co)share with others. While the shared narrative does not create any major interpretational difficulties – it can be easily applied to evocative autoethnography – because the act of autonarration calls for compassion by placing the reader in a situation where *alea iacta est*, the shareable narrative is more multi-faceted and heterogenous. It will be based on the ability to retrospect and knowledge about our own inner world, which is reflected in experiencing and recognizing emotions and adapting them in their own agency – it can therefore be described as intrapersonal intelligence. In the above view, the source of intrapersonal knowledge will be a variety of sensations, while in human memory those that have a certain emotional charge and are not indifferent (insignificant) are more intensely recorded. Thus permanent footprints will be left behind by experiences with specific attributes – after Aleida Assmann [4, p. 207] they can be described as defiance (“thoroughly significant”) and epi-fanic (“later significant”) – both of them can be evaluated positively (good/pleasant) or negatively (bad/unpleasant).

This is suggestively illustrated by the passage of “The sketch from the past” by Virginia Woolf, which can be summarized as an autoethnographic miniature: *“These are three examples of exceptional moments. I often recall them, or rather they unexpectedly come to the surface themselves. Now, however, I write them down for the first time and I realized something that I had not realized before. Two of these moments led me to a state of despair. The third, however, brought me satisfaction. <...> Although I still have this special <...> that I am experiencing such sudden shocks, now I always greet them willingly; after the first surprise, I always feel immediately that they are particularly valuable. And that's how I realize that it's this ability to experience shocks that makes me a writer. I will take a chance of an explanation that in my case after the shock there is an immediate desire to explain it. I feel that I have received a blow, but this is not what I thought, being a child, simply a blow inflicted by an enemy hiding behind the cotton of everyday life, it is or will be a kind of epiphany; it is a sign of some real thing hidden behind appearances, and I make it real, putting it into words”* [20, pp. 71–72].

Referring to heterogeneity, shared narratives can be understood in the following dimensions:

- 1) as an alternative to the dominant discourse – supplementing the “white spots”, reviewing the past, making the topic from a different point of view, filling in the floating gap, reaching for taboo topics;
- 2) as a response to a shared narrative and maintaining the epiphenomenon flowing from it – taken the community of thought or experience as a base; in this area the narrative enters into a dialogue that can take the form of a fictional conversation understood as a literary genre, meetings of real people or meetings of real communities (in the people who represent them);
- 3) as a silent concealment or oblivion, bearing in mind that narrative applications arise from the needs, requirements or challenges of the present, and giving meaning to personal history takes place through its transmission;
- 4) as a consequence of the above – as a timber/material for conversational social history, as well as for socio-knowledge existing between human beings, not in themselves as essential mediators.

Coming into prominence of personal messages, often on subjects going beyond the scientific continuum, makes the academic community an interbiographic community – community which is co-sharing narratives. How many narrations there are in the space for (co)sharing and to what extent personal experience and histories of emotions behind them constitute a methodological tool – one can observe by following the direction of self-reflexive turn within scientific writing and intellectual biographies. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that all individual experiences and memories associated with them, belonging to the class of personal affirmations, that is, those which takes as their subject the story of a given individual's life [12, p. 64] are phantom stories – which like pain, we are not able to share in full with each other.

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Чйковски А. «Человек – Слово – Парадигма» в основе биографически ориентированного научного письма // Гуманитарно-педагогические исследования. 2022. Т. 6. № 2. С. 35–42.

Czajkowska A. Human – Word – Paradigm. At the foundations of biographically oriented scientific writing, *Gumanitarno-pedagogicheskie issledovaniya* [Humanitarian and pedagogical Research], 2022, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 35–42.
Дата поступления статьи – .2022; 0, 84 печ. л.

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